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Abstract
Two fundamental assumptions guide this survey of recent
research on anaphora. The first is that anaphoric
expressions do not refer to segments in a text or
discourse, but to entities which are assumed to be in the
language receiver's mind. The second assumption is that a
text serves to suggest the referents for anaphora, as does
the non-linguistic context. As a result, this survey is
organized into a consideration of the following questions:
1. What types of entities are possible antecedents in
English?
2. What is the relation of the text to these
antecedents?
3. What is the relation of inference to these
antecedents?
4. What does anaphora say about memory organization?
5. What factors have been posed as influencing anaphor
resolution?
6. What is known about anaphora and language
acquisition?
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Introduction
In understanding language understanding, and in particular,
reading comprehension, it is almost a truism to say that one
cannot stop at the analysis of single sentences alone. In
comprehending text, the import of each successive sentence must
be determined within, and integrated into, an incrementally
growing model of text content and purpose. Now it is also almost
a truism that much has been gained already through the formal
analyses of sentence-level syntax and semantics that have been
put forth in both the context of transformational grammar and
that of machine-based natural language question-answering systems
(Landsbergen, 1976; Scha, 1976; Winograd, 1972; Woods et al.,
1972)
In moving from single sentences to connected text, we need
to enlarge our domain of analysis. On what does the connectivity
of text draw? What inter-sentential devices carry over to text
that most important function of sentence-level syntax which
Huggins (in press) describes as "a way of maximizing the rate of
transfer of meaning from a language producer (a speaker or
writer) to a language receiver (a listener or reader), taking
into account the limitations of memory of the receiver". What
sorts of knowledge and processing heuristics must be possessed by
the language receiver to handle text containing such devices?
What would result from their absence?
One such inter-sentential device, anaphora, is the subject
of this survey. Anaphoric expressions comprise pronouns,
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pro-verbs, some definite noun phrases and ellipses. They
epitomize a device for "maximizing the rate of transfer of
meaning": for example, one short syllable, "it", has the
potential for evoking in the language receiver's mind a comolex
theoretical construct or an entire chain of events leadina to
some conclusion,
"It was christened by Feynmann 'the eight-fold way'."
"In the end, it drove Lear mad."
There are two fundamental assumptions about anaphora in
which this survey is grounded. The first is that ananhoric
expressions do not refer to segments in a text, but to entities
which are assumed to be in the language receiver's mind. The
second assumption is that a text serves to suggest the referents
for anaphora, as does the non-linguistic context. (The latter is
discussed at length in an excellent paper by Hankamer and Saq
(1976). It will receive only brief mention here.) The result is
a model of comprehension in which the relation of antecedent to
anaphor is indirect: the text or non-linguistic environment
evokes entities in the language receiver's mind which may be
addressed, in turn, anaphorically.
(A line is being drawn here between the two notions of
anaphora and deixis (Rubin, in press ). Deixis, as another
linguistic device for pointing to things, shares with anaphora
the above-mentioned function of allowing a language producer to
maximize the rate of information flow out to a language receiver.
However, deictic expressions are seen as pointing to things
within the shared spatial and/or temporal context of language
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producer and receiver, while anaphoric expressions are seen as
pointing to entities in the language receiver's mind. An effect
of deictic pointing to "external" things - "You see that chair
there?" - may be to engender "internal" entities which may then
be addressed anaphorically - "Well, I paid almost "200 for it.")
I see several reasons for discussing anaphora here as an
illustration of inter-sentential devices in reading
comprehension. First, if a reader does not recognize an
expression as anaphoric, or if he or she is unable to handle it
as the writer intended, then there is no way that he or she can
build up a correct model of the text. Secondly, as recent
research in artificial intelligence, psychology, philosophy and
linguistics has shown, the process of anaphor resolution may
demand very sophisticated syntactic, semantic, pragmatic,
inferential and evaluative abilities on the reader's part. Such
abilities are even needed to determine what the possible
antecedents could be! One might suspect therefore that anaphora
might easily be a source of comprehension difficulties. Thirdly,
research on anaphora has been very piece-meal (and in rather
small pieces, at that) and its observations and results lie
scattered through the linguistics, psychology, artificial
intelligence and philosophy literatures. There has been no
unifying characterization or study of anaphora, and as a result,
it is a poorly understood phenomenon. This survey of recent
research on anaphora is directed at such a characterization.
There is at least one major topic relevant to anaphora which
space limitations preclude my taking up here. That is a survey of
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computer-based attempts to handle anaphoric expressions. Such
attempts may be found in (Baranofsky, 1970; Burton, 1976;
Charniak, 1972, 1973; Deutsch, 1975a, 1975b; Grosz, forthcoming;
Hobbs, 1976; Klappholz & Lockman, 1975; Levin, 175; Norman &
Rumelhart, 1975; Rieger, 1974; Rosenberg, 1976; Wilks, 1975;
Winograd, 1972; Woods et al., 1972). While these systems are
only first- or second-order attempts at modeling anaphoric
processing, they do point to real problems that any more
sopfisticated model must overcome.
Finally, before I begin, there is one point I would like to
emphasize. The formal view of language which guides much of this
survey on anaphora is not only compatible with other more
pragmatic, intention- or belief-oriented points of view (Morgan,
in press) but is entirely complementary. To see this, consider
the following example: when asked to recommend John Smith for a
vacant assistant professorship, his advisor writes "Mr. Smith has
a lovely wife". Viewing this sentence pragmatically will assign
it an import which damns Mr. Smith with irrelevant praise. On
the other hand, viewing it formally will identify those entities
that the sentence evokes in the language receiver's mind:
namely, the individuals John and John's wife, the description
"lovely wife" and "wife", and the predicate "having a lovely
wife". All and only these entities are accessible pronominally
or elliptically in subsequent sentences, which may of course
continue to reflect the writer's beliefs about John Smith. E.g.
Mr. Smith has a lovely wife.
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- Moreover, her father attended this university.
or
- Moreover, his brother does too.
or
- His previous one was quite ugly.
A. Antecedents
1. What types of entities are possible antecedents in English?
Probably the most important thing to understand about
antecedents is that they are not the elements in the text but are
those suggested by it, those concepts being evoked or constructed
in the reader's mind. That is, the antecedent of "it" in
la. Mary gave Sue a T-shirt.
b. She thanked her for it.
is not the string "a T-shirt" but the concept the reader should
have of the T-shirt that Mary just gave Sue. To some, this may be
an obvious point, but the popular misconception that "a pronoun
stands for a noun" indicates that it is not as obvious as one
might think. Given this observation, the real question becomes:
which concepts that should be evoked or built in the reader's
head does the language allow one to reference or re-use?
Obviously, not everything is a possible antecedent in English:
there is, for example, no anaphor whose antecedent is an
adjective, a string of adjectives, an adverb, a preposition, or a
quantifier. For example, there is no way to get around saying
"all except three" in
2a. All except three boys love their mothers.
b. _____ girls do too.
Researchers have noted many different types of antecedents
that English allows. I shall mention several here, in order to
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illustrate some of the skills that processing anaphora demands of
a reader.
Examples 3 and 4 show two types of antecedents: individual
concepts and sets of individuals.
3a. Mary took her nieces to Design Research, where
b. she bought each of the girls a T-shirt.
c. They thanked her for them.
4a. John met Mary and Alice at Logan airport.
b. They took a taxi home.
The antecedent of "she" in 3b. is the explicitly mentioned woman,
Mary. On the other hand, each antecedent of "they" (and "them")
in 3c. and 4b. is a set of objects. However, the three antecedent
sets differ radically with respect to how they come about. In
3c., the antecedent of "tney," is the explicitly mentioned set of
Mary's nieces, that of "them" is the set of T-shirts, each of
which Mary gave to some one of her nieces. This set is not given
explicitly but must be derived from one T-shirt per niece and
several nieces. The antecedent of "they" in 4b. is the set of
John, Mary and Alice, a set which again is not given explicitly
in the text but must be constructed. (Notice that if this
example were "John didn't meet Mary and Alice at Logan. They took
a taxi home.", one wouldn't infer the above set of three people -
"they" is probably just Mary and Alice.)
Notice that such individual concepts also include continuous
entities (mass concepts), as well as particular quantities of
them, as in Examples 5 and 6.
5a. Water constitutes 76% of the earth's surface.
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b. It occurs as a solid in ice bergs, as a gas in the
atmosphere, and as a liquid in root beer.
6. When John spilled water on the sofa, the dog licked it
up.
In 5b, the antecedent of "it" is the mass concept, water, and in
6, the particular quantity of water that John spilled.
Example 7 shows a third type of antecedent: generic or class
concepts.
7a. A German Shepherd bit me yesterday.
b. They are really vicious beasts.
The antecedent of "they" is the generic concept "German
Shepherds" which the reader is assumed to be able to derive from
the particular one doing the biting. I am asserting that, as a
class, they are vicious beasts.
A fourth type of antecedent could be termed functions, since
they are similar to the mathematical notion of a procedure which
associates a value with its argument(s). A function differs from
a traditional "antecedent" in that it is not a particular object
to which one is referring, but rather to a way of defining a new
object, given a new set of arguments. In Example 8,
8. The man who gives his paycheck to his wife is
wiser than the man who gives it to his mistress.
"paycheck" can be thought of as a unary function "paycheck of X",
whose argument X ranges over wage-earners and whose value, for a
given wage-earner, is a particular paycheck. The antecedent of
"it" in this example is the function "paycheck of X", with X now
bound to this new kind of man - one who gives his paycheck to his
mistress. Such antecedents have been discussed by linguists
under the title "pronouns of laziness" (Bartsch, 1976; Edmondson,
1976; Geach, 1962; Karttunen, 1969; Partee, 1972, 1975).
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Predicates constitute a fifth type of antecedent, where
again the notion of antecedent has to be stretched somewhat. A
predicate antecedent is not a specific object or action mentioned
previously, but again is a way of defining new ones. Where the
antecedent of an anaphoric expression is a predicate, the
expression evokes a new object or action, one for which the same
predicate is true. A predicate is anything which can be thought
of as a property of something or as a relationship between
things. Syntactic verb phrases, for example, may be understood as
predicates. Predicates may be asserted or questioned as in
John is a doctor.
Did John meet a lama in Nepal?
where the predicate "being a doctor" can be taken to be asserted
of John in the first sentence and that of "meeting a lama in
Nepal" can be taken to be asked about John in the second.
Alternatively, the second sentence can be read as questioning
whether the predicate "John meeting a lama in place X" is true of
Nepal, or whether the predicate "Y meeting Z in Nepal" is true of
John and some lama. That sentences rarely have a single
interpretation as to what is being predicated of what is
extremely important to anaphoric reference, as will be discussed
later.
In addition to being asserted, questioned or even ordered
(e.g. "Be a good girl."), predicates may also be used
descriptively to specify one or more members of the class the
predicate is true of. Consider the phrase
A green tie-dyed T-shirt which Mary bought at DR
- 9 -
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There are four simple predicates here - green, tie-dyed, T-shirt
and 'which Mary bought at DR' - all of which are true of any
object denoted by this phrase. Note that one or more of these
simple predicates can be composed into a single complex
predicate, such as 'tie-dyed T-shirt', 'green tie-dyed T-shirt',
'T-shirt which Mary bought at DR', etc. Complex predicates, as
well as simple ones, can function as antecedents, and again
comprehension requires the ability to recognize and manipulate
them.
Examples 9,10 and 11 all contain instances of anaphora whose
antecedents are predicates.
9a. Mary bought a green tie-dyed T-shirt.
b. Fred bought one too, though he wanted a red one.
10a. I can walk and I can chew gum.
b. Ford can 0 too, but not at the same time.
Ila. Garth beats his wife.
b. Fred does 0 too, though she hits him back.
The antecedent of the first "one" in 7b. is the complex
predicate 'green tie-dyed T-shirt', which is true of what Fred
bought. It is probably not the same T-shirt as the one Mary
bought (though that is a pragmatic inference, not one derivable
linguistically). The antecedent of the second "one" is the
predicate 'tie-dyed T-shirt', from which the more complex
predicate 'green tie-dyed T-shirt' has been composed. Because
this latter predicate is incompatible with the predicate 'red'
which is also true of what Fred bought, it cannot be the
antecedent of "one" in this case.
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Examples 10 and 11 illustrate ellipsed verb phrases ("null
anaphora"), indicated by "0". The antecedent of such an anaphor
is always a predicate. In example 10, it is the complex predicate
'walk and chew gum'. Note that this predicate was not given
explicitly in the text, but had to be derived from the two simple
predicates "walk' and 'talk', which were earlier predicated
separately of me. In Example 13, the antecedent of the ellipsed
verb phrase is ambiguous: it is either the predicate 'beats his
wife', asserting that Fred also beats his own wife, or the
predicate 'beats Garth's wife', asserting that the poor woman is
doubly put upon. (Discussion of examples similar to these can be
found in (Bresnan, 1971; Grinder and Postal, 1971; Partee, 1972;
Sag, 1976) under such labels as "sloppy identity" and "identity
of sense anaphora".)
Events, actions, and states may also serve as antecedents,
as in Examples 12 and 13.
12. John dunked Mary's braids in the inkwell. Because it made
her cry, he apologized for doing it.
13. Sam is a male chauvinist, and he's not ashamed to admit
it.
In the first example, both the event corresponding to John's
dunking Mary's braids in the inkwell (the specific incident that
made her cry), as well as the action, dunking Mary's braids in
the inkwell (what John apologized for doing), are available
antecedents. In Example 13, being a male chauvinist can serve as
an antecedent for "it".
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Another type of antecedent comprises entities which are
introduced contextually through the writer and reader's shared
knowledge of the world. For example in
14a. John's room was a mess.
b. Even his sneakers were dangling from the chandelier!
I presume the antecedent of "the chandelier" is the one in John's
room. Such context-definite noun phrases are discussed at great
length in (Chafe, 1976; Charniak, 1972, 1973; Clark, 1975;
Deutsch, 1975a, 1975b; Grosz, forthcoming; Haviland & Clark,
1974; Hobbs, 1976; Klappholz & Lockman, 1975; Rieger, 1974;
Rosenberg, 1976).
Finally, as a consequence of the claim that anaphoric
expressions refer to entities in the speaker's and listener's
minds, there is no need for such entities to exist in any real
sense. Thus a hypothetical individual, set, event, etc. may serve
as the referent of an anaphoric expression. For example,
15a. John wants to catch a trout for dinner.
b. He plans to eat it with sauteed almonds.
Here the referent of "it" is the trout that John will have if his
desire to catch one is fulfilled. Issues of reference and
existence are discussed in (Bartsch, 1976; Edmondson, 1976;
Karttunen, 1971; Lakoff, 1970; Nash-Webber & Reiter, 1976;
Partee, 1972).
To summarize this section, I have presented what I believe
to be a partial answer to the relevant question, "What types of
entities are possible antecedents in English?". It should be
clear now, for example, that pronouns do not just "stand for"
nouns, and that just being capable of evoking possible
- 12 -
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antecedents for an anaphoric expression presumes complex
cognitive abilities on the part of any understander.
2. What is the relationship of the text to these antecedents?
As Hankamer and Sag (1976) point out, it has long been known
that certain anaphoric expressions do not require a linguistic
antecedent, but can be controlled by some aspect of the
non-linguistic environment shared by the speaker and listener.
Thus, if I'm eating a mushroom and you say to me, "Do you realize
that it's hallucinogenic?", the antecedent of "it" is the
mushroom that I am eating, which neither of us has mentioned, but
which both of us are aware of. Most often in reading, the writer
and the reader have little or no shared non-linguistic
environment, so that most anaphoric expressions will have as
antecedents entities derived from the text.
In the previous section, I mentioned several different types
of antecedent entities - individuals, sets, events, functions,
predicates, etc. Obviously not every stretch of text will evoke
each type of antecedent, though it is entirely possible for an
entity presumably evoked in one way to be reconfigured into an
antecedent of another type (See Section A.3). Thus it may not be
a profitable question to ask what antecedents can be evoked by a
particular piece of text. On the other hand, it is profitable to
ask what antecedents can not be evoked by a particular piece of
text, and it is to this auestion that some recent research in
linguistics has been addressed.
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Kuno (1970) and Karttunen (1971), for example, have pointed
out that noun phrases in predicate nominative position do not
evoke individual referenceable entities. That is, in example
16a., "he" may only refer to Bert and not "a Maori" (or the Maori
that Bert is), while in 16b., "he" may refer to either Bert or
the Maori he met yesterday.
16a. Bert is a Maori. He lives in New Zealand.
b. Bert met a Maori yesterday. He lives in New Zealand.
However, both instances of "a Maori" evoke entities which can
serve as either generic antecedents (Example 17) or predicate
antecedents (Example 18).
17a. Bert is a Maori. They are indigenous to New Zealand.
b. Bert met a Maori yesterday. They are indigenous to New
Zealand.
-("they" = the generic class of Maoris)
18a. Bert is a Maori, and Fred is one too.
b. Bert met a Maori yesterday, and Fred met one today.
-("one" = a Maori)
In another paper, Kuno (1975) has also pointed out that no
single entity introduced in a noun phrase of "exhaustive listing"
may serve as an individual antecedent of a pronoun, though the
entity evoked by the entire phrase may. Thus in Example 19,
19a. It was Mary, John and Marsha who flunked Comp. Sci. 112.
b.*He also flunked AM261b.
c. They played bridge every night of the term.
"John", who was introduced in a noun phrase of "exhaustive
interpretation" cannot be the antecedent of "he", although the
whole group can be the antecedent of "they". (Obviously if John
had been introduced earlier in the discourse, as well as being
mentioned in this noun phrase, one could refer to him as "he".)
- 14 -
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Karttunen (1971) also notes that existential noun phrases do
not introduce individual antecedents when they occur in certain
negative contexts as in Examples 20 and 21.
20a. Bill doesn't have a car.
b. *It is black.
21a. John failed to find an answer.
b. *It was wrong.
22a. Bill didn't marry a blonde.
b. She had red hair.
Both the simple explicit negative in Example 20 and the
implicitly negative verb 'fail' in Example 21 should keep the
reader from creating an entity which could serve as an individual
antecedent - the car Bill doesn't have or the answer John failed
to find. Both existential phrases, of course, could evoke
predicate antecedents: that is, 20a. could sensibly be followed
by "Frank has one", and 21a., by "Bill made one up." However, a
primary problem with negation in English is that it may not be
clear from the given sentence just what is being negated, in
particular, whether the existential is within the scope of
negation. Thus in example 22., the existential noun phrase does
introduce an individual antecedent, the female Bill married: what
is denied is her blondness, not the existence of such a woman.
However, we can not know this from sentence 22a. alone. Only when
it becomes necessary to justify a referent for "she" in sentence
22b. is a particular scoping forced on us.
Before concluding this section, I would like to point to one
interesting case of textual evocation of referents. Several
linguists (Bresnan, 1971; Grinder & Postal, 1971; Hankamer & Sag,
- 15 -
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1976; Sag, 1976) have argued convincingly that in the cleanest
account of verb phrase ellipsis (Examples 10 & 11 above and 24a
below), the verb phrase is present in some underlying syntactic
structure and is subsequently deleted. They have pointed out that
the deleted material nevertheless seems a potential source of
referents for anaphora. This has been called the missing
antecedent phenomenon. For example,
23a. Since Fred didn't bake a cake for Mary's birthday, John
did 0.
b. She couldn't eat it though because it was chocolate.
They argue that the first sentence arises from something like
24. Since Fred didn't bake a cake for Mary's birthday, John
baked a cake for Mary's birthday.
from which can be derived the missing antecedent for "it" -
namely, the cake John baked for Mary's birthday. Since their
arguments for a deletion account of verb phrase ellipsis are
purely syntactic and do not hinge on missing antecedents, it
appears that material deleted before a sentence "reaches the
surface" can evoke antecedents as well as material explicitly
there.
On the other hand, there are other anaphoric expressions
that linguists would like to say actually occur in the original
syntactic structure rather than being derived via deletion or
substitution of a pro-form. If such anaphora represent, in some
sense, material which could give rise to antecedent entities, the
question is whether they exhibit the missing antecedent
phenomenon as well, and if so, how. Examples like 25 and 26
illustrate the problem.
- 16 -
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25a. Although Fred couldn't bake a cake for Mary's birthday,
John managed it.
b.?However she couldn't eat it because it was too rich.
26. ?Altnough Fred didn't sink a boat carrying a gorilla, John
sank one, and it drowned.
In (25b), "it" is meant to refer to the cake John baked for
Mary's birtnday, and in (26), to the gorilla in the boat that
Jonn sank. Neither antecedent is explicit -- they seem rather to
come from the material anaphorized as "it" in (25a) and "one" in
(26). Since judgments of acceptability vary on such examples,
Bresnan (1971) has suggested that those people who accept these
examples are actually inferring an antecedent (see Section A.3)
rather than being given one linguistically. Whether her
explanation is correct or not, it would seem that more than a
single mechanism is needed to account for the existence of
antecedents.
3. What is the relationship of inference to tnese antecedents?
In introducing the previous section, I mentioned that
certain anaphoric expressions do not require a linguistically
introduced antecedent, giving the example of my eating a mushroom
and your asking me, "Do you realize it's hallucinoqenic?" All
such antecedents are available by virtue of beinq inferable from
the non-linguistic environment. What I should like to take up in
this section, albeit briefly, is the many instances where the
linguistic environment fails to provide an explicit antecedent,
so that for one to be available, it must be inferred.
- 17 -
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I will be using the term "inference" with respect to
antecedents to describe any type of reasoning or manipulative
process which can augment the set of available antecedents beyond
those which are explicit in the text. Most research in this area
has dealt with examples such as 27.
27. John found a shop manual for his Fiat, but the page
specifying the dwell angle was missing.
These have shown that inferences embodying general world
knowledge about relationships between entities are needed to
provide antecedents for definite noun phrases, which out of
context would have no unique referent and therefore make no
sense. In Example 27, the shop manual John found provides a
context in which "the page specifying ... " may denote a unique
individual, that is, the page from that shop manual. John's Fiat
likewise provides a context in which "the dwell angle" denotes an
unique individual - the dwell angle of the distributor shaft of
John's Fiat. What this research seems to lead us to conclude is
that there is probably no general world knowledge that wouldn't
be needed to justify an antecedent for some definite NP.
Since so much has been written about this one class of
inferences, often in the context of frames, I shall omit any
further discussion of it. (The reader is referred to (Chafe,
1976; Charniak, 1972, 1973; Clark, 1975; Deutsch, 1975a, 1975b;
Grosz, forthcoming; Haviland & Clark, 1974; Hobbs, 1976;
Klappholz & Lockman, 1975; Rieger, 1974; Rosenberg, 1976).
However, there are many other types which should be mentioned in
order to show the range of inferential capabilities expected of
- 18 -
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any language receiver through the language producer's use of
anaphora. (A discussion of some types of inferences needed for
resolving anaphora will be given below in Section C.)
In the following discussion, the types of inference
mentioned will be presented in order of veracity, ranging from
purely structural, always valid inferences to more contingent
ones. It is probably the case that the more contingent an
inference becomes, the more that judgments on the consequent
existence of an antecedent will vary from person to person, that
is, judgments on whether a sentence containing an anaphoric
expression referring to one of these "antecedents" makes sense.
In evaluating reading comprehension, this point might be taken
into account, that people might very as to the amount of effort
they will expend inferring an antecedent and how reliable that
inference procedure needs to be in order for them to accept its
end product as an antecedent. (This discussion is necessarily
brief and very informal. For a more rigorous and extensive
presentation of material, the reader is referred to (Nash-Webber
& Reiter, 1977; Nash-Webber, forthcoming).)
The first set of inferences involve purely structural
"re-write" rules, which are independent of the content of the
sentence they apply to. One such re-write rule is applicable
whenever a non-negative sentence contains an existentially
quantified noun phrase within the scope of a universally
quantified one, for example,
28a. Mary gave each girl a T-shirt.
- 19 -
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In such a circumstance, there will be available as a referent for
"tney" or "them", a set of things corresponding to the
existentially quantified noun phrase, each of which is linked to
one of the things associated with the universally auantified noun
phrase, for example,
28b. She bought them at Design Research.
Here "them" refers to the set of T-shirts, each of which Mary
gave to some girl. (The qualification that there be no negation
around is needed to account for the inapplicability of this rule
to sentences like
28c. Mary didn't give each girl a T-shirt.
d. Mary refused to give each girl a T-shirt.
Anotner such inference rule accounts for conjoined
predicates as antecedents, where only simple ones have been given
explicitly. This rule explains the existence of the predicate
'walk and chew gum', which is the antecedent of the ellipsed verb
phrase in Example 10 (repeated here).
10a. I can walk and I can chew gum.
b. Ford can 0 too, but not at the same time.
The reason for mentioning such simple inference rules, when
the examples I have given to illustrate them are so obvious to a
skilled understander, is to point out that these antecedents are
not really explicit and obvious and that reasoning is involved in
constructing them. If a reader does not possess or does not apply
these inference rules, he will fail to understand anaphoric
expressions referring to these antecedents and consequently fail
to understand the text.
- 20 -
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A third type of inference rule yields generic or class
antecedents from a mention of a member of the class, as
illustrated in Example 7 earlier (repeated here).
7a. A German Shepherd bit me yesterday.
b. They are really vicious beasts.
It is interesting to note that the only sets which may be
inferred in this way are ones denoted by the given lexical items.
Thus in Example 7, the only possible antecedent for "they" is the
class "German Shepherds" and not "dogs" or "mammals", etc., which
are also classes to which a German Shepherd belongs.
To end this section on inference and antecedents, I would
like to mention another phenomenon that has been discussed in the
linguistics literature (Bresnan, 1971; Lakoff & Ross, 1972; Ross,
1971) and is exemplified in sentences 29 and 30.
29. John became a guitarist because he thought it was a
beautiful instrument.
30. Max knifed me before I even realized he had one.
In Example 29, the antecedent of "it" is the guitar (understood
generically), and in Example 30, that of "one" is a knife. The
simplest account for such examples seems to involve antecedents
being somehow evoked by nearby "morphologically related" (Lakoff
and Ross' term) lexical items. While Bresnan notes, I think
correctly, that such antecedents are inferred rather than
grammatically assigned, it is not at all clear just what kinds of
inferences and inferred antecedents are acceptable to what people
in this circumstance. For example, while it seems possible to
infer a "morphologically related" generic antecedent from a given
lexical item, it does not seem possible to infer a specific
individual one, as in Example 31.
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31.*John was a guitarist before he lost it on the subway.
where "it" is meant to refer to John's guitar. Also it does not
seem possible to infer an antecedent which is morphologically
more complex than the lexical item it is related to, for example
32.*After John lost his guitar on the subway, he gave up
being one.
where "one" is meant to stand for "a guitarist".
B. Memory
In Section A.I, I claimed that antecedents are not the
elements in a text, but those suggested by it - the concepts
evoked in the language receiver's mind. Since anaphoric
expressions are capable of accessing those concepts,
characterizing aspects of the anaphor-antecedent relation should
shed light on the organization of human memory. Conversely any
theory purporting to model human memory organization should
account for what is known about antecedents and anachora.
What sorts of things are of concern here? First, consider
two entities that are known eoually well by the language
receiver. In a given state of the text or discourse, it may be
the case that one, but not the other, can be referred to
pronominally. Consider for example,
33a. I saw your mother at the Led Zeppelin movie last night.
b. She seemed to be enjoying it. *But he looked rather ill.
While "she" is meant to refer to your mother and "he" to your
father, the former reference will succeed, whereas the latter
will probably fail. This cannot be because your father is unknown
or less known to you. To account for this dichotomy, Chafe (1974,
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1976) has introduced the notion of consciousness. Only entities
which the speaker or writer assumes to be in the consciousness of
his addressee can be referred to pronominally (or with diminished
stress) . (Currently consciousness is described only by the
phenomena it is meant to explain, so further research by
linguists and psychologists in this area in obviously needed.)
Secondly, consider the following short paragraph.
34. While driving through the game reserve, I passed a
pregnant zebra, though I almost didn't notice her.
Then on past several enormous termite nests and a
river full of hippopotami, before I came to our
camp. She looked like a distended Moire pattern.
Even after a single intervening sentence, the antecedent of "she"
seems difficult to find. To account for this, Chafe attributes
consciousness with a limited capacity, with old items being
pushed out as new ones come in. For example, my pregnant zebra
remained in your consciousness long enough for you to make sense
of "I almost didn't notice her", but not long enough possibly for
"she looked like a distended Moire pattern". Chafe notes, "the
auestion of what causes the speaker to believe that an item has
left the addressee's consciousness needs systematic examination"
(Chafe, 1976, p. 32), but speculates that the factors influencing
an item's stay include the number of intervening sentences in
which it was not mentioned, as well as such discourse boundaries
as change of scene. Recent work by Grosz (Deutsch, 1975a, 1975b;
Grosz, forthcoming) has shown that in task-oriented dialogues,
whose structure closely parallels that of the task being
performed, the participants' consciousness of an item is strongly
influenced by the task structure. Viewing transcripts of actual
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dialogues between an apprentice trying to re,-assemble an air
compressor and an expert whose advice the apprentice can request,
Grosz notes several instances of pronoun references skipping over
pieces of dialogue, where in each case, the piece skipped over
was a whole segment relating to some distinct subtask or
subtasks.
Also substantiating Chafe's speculation that "change of
scene" may influence an item's stay in consciousness is a survey
of the use of "discourse links" in newspaper articles done by
Rosenberg (1976). After charting the thematic structure of
several articles from the New York Times, Rosenberg notes that in
his sample there were no instances of pronominal reference which
crossed thematic boundaries. Even though his sample was small, it
is probably the case that such cross-overs really are rare.
There is one more thing I would like to take up before
concluding this section on antecedents, anaphora and memory and
that is again the problem of missing antecedents. Reconsider
Example 26 (repeated below).
26.?Although Fred didn't sink a boat carrying a gorilla, John
sank one, and it drowned.
If the question is asked, what did John sink, the answer would be
a boat carrying a gorilla. That is, resolving the pronoun "one"
indirectly yields a gorilla. Yet many people do not see an
appropriate antecedent for "it" in this example. (The boat that
John sank may suggest itself, but will be rejected on the grounds
that boats don't drown.) That is, these people seem to have in
their consciousness a boat, but not a gorilla, even though they
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understand the antecedent of "one" to be a boat carrying a
gorilla. I don't agree with Bresnan (1071) that this is a case of
people's varying capacity to infer an antecedent. I see this as a
oroblem that will be solved when we understand the partner to
Chafe's question above. That is, what causes the speaker to
believe an item has entered the listener's consciousness in the
first place?
C. Anaphor Resolution
Resolving an anaphoric expression, be it a pro-form or a
definite noun phrase, refers to the process of determining its
intended referent. Many factors have been suggested as
influencing a reader or listener's choice of intended referent,
more than I can adequately survey in the limited space available.
What I shall do instead is present a short piece of text
containing several anaphoric expressions and for many, mention
factors that have been discussed in the literature as applicable
to its correct resolution. In many cases, the examples may not
seem to justify, in and of themselves, hypothesizing these
factors as an appropriate level of explanation. So interested
readers are advised to consult the original sources to discover
the range of phenomena each is meant to account for.
35. Fred left his niece at home and went to the zoo with Mary
and John.
36. It had not yet opened, so they sat down on the grass
outside.
37. Suddenly near John he saw a snake.
38. The girl saw it too, as did John.
39. Fred admired John because he reacted so quickly.
40. John regretted not having a stick, since he could have
used it to bash the snake.
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One simple factor influencing the choice of an antecedent
for "they" in sentence 36, as well as "he" in sentence 37, is
that in English, most pronouns are marked for number and gender.
So in sentence 36, "they" must refer to something interpretable
as a set of more than one item, while in 37, "he" must refer to
an animate entity which is not explicitly marked "female". (That
"they" is taken to refer to Fred, Mary and John would result from
deriving such a set.)
In sentence 37, that "he" refers to Fred and not to John
could be explained by the interaction of three factors that have
been discussed in the linguistics literature (aside from Fred's
being the only other male around). The first is a syntactic
constraint blocking John from being the antecedent of "he". This
has been rendered in various forms in the literature, the
earliest being the "Precede-Command Condition" (PCC), which seems
to have been formulated indeoendently by several researchers
including Langacker (1966), Postal (1Q66) , and Ross (1967), which
vasow (1976) renders as
Precede-Command Condition: A noun ohrase A may serve as
the antecedent for a pronoun B (wnich agrees with A in
the relevant features, including person, number and
gender) if and only if either
(a) B follows A in the discourse, or
(b) A and B are in the same sentence, and B does not
command A.
A node X is said to command node Y if every S dominating X
dominates Y.
Recently a revised notion of command was offered (Culicover,
1976; Reinhart, 1976), in which it refers to relative depth of
embedding. X "C-commands" Y (Peinhart's term) if every left
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branching node dominating X dominates Y. The two notions of
command differ somewhat in their predictions, although both of
them would block "he-John" as a possible anaphor-antecedent pair
in 36.
The second and third explanations for Fred's being the
antecedent of "he" are based on notions of theme (Kuno, 1976) and
a simple cognitive strategy in which the roles of the
participants in a discourse are changed as little as possible
(Maratsos, 1973). Both would point to the fact that Fred is the
subject of sentence 35, the opening sentence of the discourse. A
thematic explanation would say that Fred is the theme of the
discourse and therefore most easily pronominalizable, being what
the reader is most conscious of. The latter, "inertial",
explanation would say that since Fred is in the subject role in a
previous sentence, the reader will interpret subsequent
sentences, if possible, with him in that same role. (One of
Maratsos' experiments to show the existence of this strategy is
discussed in Section D.)
In sentence 36, that "it" refers to the zoo and not to
Fred's home may be explained on semantic grounds, that a zoo is
more likely to open than a home. Such semantic selectional
restrictions have been used in several computer-based natural
language understanding systems in resolving anaphora (Charniak,
1972; Wilks, 1975; Winograd, 1972; Woods et al., 1972).
In sentence 38, "the girl" is understood as referring to
Mary, even though two girls have been mentioned, Mary and Fred's
niece. Recency - Mary being the last female mentioned - might be
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one factor influencing this assignment. But it might also be the
case that Chafe's notion of change of scene is at work here; of
the two, only Mary participates in the park scene. (Note that
the fact that Mary is a girl, rather than say a woman, falls out
of the anaphor-antecedent assignment: it is not known a priori.
If sentence 34 had been "The woman saw it too", Mary would still
have been assumed to be the antecedent, and the fact that she was
a woman would have fallen out. This issue of anaphor resolution
resulting in a further characterization of a known entity is
discussed at length in Rieger (1074).)
In sentence 39, "he" would normally be understood as
referring to John. This cannot be the result of-syntactic factors
or recency because in similar sentences such as
41. Fred phoned John because he needed help.
"he" would probably be understood as referring to Fred. Garvey,
Caramazza and Yates (1974) attribute both these choices to a
factor that they call implicit causality, which biases the
assignment of an antecedent toward the candidate "primarily
responsible for instigating the action or state denoted by the
antecedent clause". In sentence 39, John would be held
responsible for Fred's admiration, while in 41, Fred would be
responsible for the phone call. The authors conclude from their
experiments that this factor is not an all-or-none thing, but
only a bias, which may be attenuated by such other factors as
passivization of the antecedent clause (which overtly marks the
surface subject noun phrase as the topic of the sentence),
negation (which alters the sense of causality), and the relative
status of the candidates.
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In sentence 40, the antecedent of "it" is the stick John
would have in the (set of) possible world(s) in which he had one.
That is, "it" refers to a non-existent entity. However, the
clause in which "it" occurs may also be understood as referring
to that same (set of) possible worlds. (This would not be the
case if "it" occurred in a sentence like "He used it to bash the
snake", which would reauire the antecedent of "it" to exist in
the current world.) Different possible worlds are associated
with different hypothetical contexts (future and modal worlds),
as well as different peoples' beliefs and desires. Possible
worlds as a factor influencing anaphor-antecedent assignments is
discussed in (Karttunen, 1968,1971; Kuno, 1970; Lakoff, 1970).
The above short text does not provide a framework for
discussing all of the factors which have been proposed to account
for antecedent assignments. Other factors include task-structure
in task-oriented dialogues, mentioned earlier in Section B,
emphatic stress (Akmajian & Jackendoff, 1970), and empathy (Kuno,
1975, 1976). With all these factors hypothesized as influencing
anaphor-antecedent assignments, it is important to note that no
one has tried to model how these factors might interact in human
anaphor resolution.
D. Skill Acquisition
In the preceding sections, I have noted some knowledge and
skills that a competent language understander uses in deriving
possible antecedents and resolving anaphoric expressions. What I
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will try to do here is review what is known (or believed) about a
child's acquisition of these skills and point out some further
questions that might be investigated.
First, with respect to antecedents, Huxley (1970), observing
the spontaneous speech of two children, age 3-4, noted that "it"
seemed to be correctly understood by that age when it referred to
an individual inanimate antecedent such as "cup", "table", etc.
However, there are several other types of possible antecedents
for "it" besides individual count terms, including mass terms
(e.g. "milk") and collections of individuals (e.g. "a box of
marbles"). A developmental study on the conceptualization of
these as antecedents for "it" was carried out by Chipman and
de Dardel (1974). They presented children between the ages of 3
and 7 with a display containing a flat cake of clay, a box
containing five marbles, a box containing 20 marbles, and a tray
containing various size pieces of plasticine chocolate. Then each
child was given the four instructions:
1) There is clay there. Give it to me.
2) There is a box with five marbles. Give it to me.
3) There are 20 marbles in the box. Give it to me.
4) There is chocolate there. Give it to me.
At all ages, the children were most successful at responding to
the request for clay (a mass term), then the box of five marbles
(a small collection of individuals), then the box of 20 marbles
(a large collection of individuals), and finally the chocolate
(either a mass term or a collection). But even at age 6, where
the children's success rate on the clay and the box of 5 marbles
was up to 90% (from 30% and 10% respectively, at age 3), their
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success rate on the box of 20 marbles was still only 50% and on
the chocolate, only 10%! As far as the types of errors the
children made, let me quote from Chipman and de Dardel.
For the clay item, the main error consisted in the
children giving a piece of the clay cake which they
broke off. For the box of five marbles, the youngest
children gave one marble; the children aged 4-5 years
gave several but not all marbles; and finally our
eldest children (5-6 years) gave all the marbles from
the box (but without the box). On the box of 20 marbles
item, very few little children gave one marble only:
most of them gave several but not all marbles, while
our eldest children again gave all the marbles from the
box (again without the box). For the chocolate item,
the youngest children gave one little piece of
chocolate. The children aged 4-5 years gave more than
one little piece of chocolate, these being either
several of the same type of piece (the smaller
rectangles) or several of two different types (the
smaller and the larger rectangles). Only two of the 42
subjects ever gave all the chocolate. (Chipman and de
Dardel, 1974, pp. 95-96)
Their conclusions center on the child's developing ability
to conceptualize either a mass term or a collection of
individuals as an individual in its own right, pointing out that
it seems to parallel the child's cognitive development in
general. I do not know of any research concerned with the other
types of antecedents I mentioned earlier, but obviously such work
can illuminate our understanding of the child's developing
abilities to use and comprehend anaphora correctly.
With respect to the child's growing ability to resolve
anaphora correctly, there are at least two relevant studies. One
is by Carol Chomsky (1969) on syntactic structure and
co-reference, and the other is by Michael Maratsos (1973) on
stress and co-reference. As I mentioned in discussing anaohor
resolution in Section C., there are cases where the sentence
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structure seems to block an otherwise plausible
anaphor-antecedent pair. For example, whereas in Example 42a, the
pronoun and John may be co-referential (though not necessarily),
in Example 42b, such co-reference is blocked.
42a. Knowing that he was going to be late bothered John.
b. Knowing that John was going to be late bothered him.
Chomsky hypothesized that since the rules for non-identity seem
to be fairly complex - linguists have spent many years attempting
to characterize them - the child would acquire this skill fairly
late. Using sentences such as the following,
43a. He found out that Mickey won the race.
b. After he got the candy, Mickey left.
c. Pluto thinks he knows everything.
d. He didn't know why Pluto felt so sad.
e. If he wins the race, Pluto will be very happy.
f. Mickey yawned when he sat down.
Cnomsky found that it was not until about 5.6 years that a child
learns the notion of a non-coreference restriction on pronouns,
as well as selectivity in applying it. This goes against the
common assumption that by five a child has mastered the syntax of
his native language.
Maratsos (1973) based his research on Akmajian and
Jackendoff's (1970) observation that, for adults, "the presence
or absence of emphatic stress sometimes has clear effects on the
reference of pronouns and other anaphors". So in Example 44,
44. John hit Harry and then Sarah hit him.
if "him" is spoken normally, without stress, adults generally
take it as refering to Harry, whereas if it is stressed, John
becomes the one to be hit.
- 32 -
Anaphora
Maratsos noted that in his test sentences, the unstressed
pronouns could be interpreted using a simple strategy in which
the roles of the sentence participants are changed as little as
possible: in Example 44 (unstressed), Harry stays the one being
hit. In the interpretation which adults adopt in the case of a
stressed pronoun, the worm turns and roles are reversed. Maratsos
hypothesized that the simple strategy would be acquired early and
applied indiscriminately, while the departure from it for
stressed pronouns would only come with age and experience with
adults. Maratsos tested 106 children, aged 3,4 and 5, having them
act out with dolls sentences like 39 above. His results show that
all the children are consistently successful with unstressed
pronouns, over 85% accuracy. with stressed pronouns, however,
accuracy seemed to improve with overall linguistic competence,
going from 28% to 1%. Children in the group showing the lowest
overall linguistic competence acted out stressed pronouns like
unstressed ones 72% of the time. While this is not the only
affect of stress on reference (nor the only case of "normal"
reference assignments being violated), Maratsos' approach, like
that of Chomsky, of hypothesizing a simple cognitive strategy
which the child acquires and uses indiscriminately until he
learns under what circumstances it must be violated seems to be a
valid one which might help to explain problems and retardations
in understanding anaphoric expressions.
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Conclusion
In this paper I have tried to bring together a variety of
ideas on the subject of anaphora. The problems raised by anaphora
impinge on several fields. In philosophy, anaphora touches on
issues of reference and possible worlds; in psychology, on issues
of memory organization and language acquisition; in linguistics,
on issues of general syntactic constraints and sentence
generation and interpretation; and in artificial intelligence, on
the use of diverse sources of knowledge and the control of
inferential processing.
I have tried to show that for anaphora to be understood
correctly, many different skills may be required, both to derive
possible antecedents and to resolve anaphoric expressions against
them. These skills would be necessary for understanding spoken
language as well as written language, though speech provides
additional clues, in the form of stress to aid in resolution.
There have been no studies, to my knowledge, of the ease with
which readers notice and comprehend anaphoric expressions
correctly. I hope this paper will be an impetus to them.
Bibliography
Akmajian, A. & Jackendoff, R. Coreferentiality and Stress.
Linguistic Inquiry, 1970, 1(1), 124-126.
Baranofsky, S. Some Heuristics for Automatic Detection and
Resolution of Anapnora in DIscourse. UnpublTEshed masterTs
thesis, University of Texas at Austin, 1970.
Bartsch, R. Syntax and Semantics of Relative Clauses. In R.
Bartsch, J. Groenendijk & M. Stokhof (Eds.), Amsterdam
Papers on Formal Grammars. The Netherlands: University of
Amsterdam, 1976.
- 34 -
Anaohora
Bresnan, J. A Note on the Notion "Identity of Sense Anaphora".
Linguistic Inquiry, 1971, 2(4), 589-597.
Burton, R. Semantic Grammar: An engineering technicrue for
constructing natural language understanding systems. (BBN
Report No. 3433). . ambr-dge MA: Bolt Beranek and Newman
Inc., 1976.
Chafe, W. Language and Consciousness. Language, 1974, 50(1),
111-133.
Chafe, W. Givenness, Contrastiveness, Definiteness, Subjects,
Topics and Points of View. In C. Li (Ed.), Subject and
Topic. New York: Academic Press, 1976.
Charniak, E. Towards a Model of Children's Story Comprehension.
(Technical Report 266). Cambridge MA: MIT Artificial
Intelligence Laboratory, 1972.
Charniak, E. Context and the Reference Problem. In R. Rustin
(Ed.), Natural Language Processing. New York: Algorithmics
Press, 1973.
Chipman, H. and de Dardel, C. Developmental Study of the
Comprehension and Production of the Pronoun "it". Journal
of Psycholinguistic Research, 1974, 3(2), 91-99.
Chomsky, C. The Acquisition of Syntax in Children from 5 to .10
Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1969.
Clark, H. Bridging. In B. Nash-Webber and R. Schank (Eds.),
Theoretical Issues in Natural Language Processing. Cambridqe
MA, 1975.
Culicover, P. A Constraint on Coreferentiality. Foundations of
Language, 1976, 14(1).
Deutsch, B. Discourse Analysis and Pragmatics. In D. Walker
(Ed.), Speech Understanding Research - SRI Annual Technical
Report, AprTV 1974 - March 1975. (a) ---
Deutsch, B. Establishing Context in Task Oriented Dialogs.
American Journal of Computational Linguistics, 1975, 4. (b)
Edmondson, J.A. Semantics, Games and Anaphoric Chains. In
R. Bartsch, J. Groenendijk & M. Stokhof (Eds.), Amsterdam
Papers on Formal Grammars (Vol. 1). The Netherlands:
University of Amsterdam, 1976.
Garvey, C., Caramazza, A. and Yates, J. Factors Influencing
Assignment of Pronoun Antecedents. Cognition, 1974, 3(3),
227-244.
- 35 -
Anaphora
Geach, P. Reference and Generality. New York: Cornell University
Press, 1962.
Grinder, J. & Postal, P. Missing Antecedents. Linguistic
Inquiry, 1971, 2(3), 269-312.
Grosz, B. The Representation and Use of Focus in Dialoa
Understanding. FortEcomTng doctoral dTssertatTon, Universt"
of CalTTforna at Berkeley.
Hankamer, J. & Sag, I. Deep and Surface Anaphora. Linguistic
Inquiry, 1976, 7(3), 391-42P.
Haviland, S. & Clark, H. What's New? Acauiring New Information
as a Process in Comprehension. J. of Verbal Learning and
Verbal Behavior, 1974, 13(5), 512-521.
Hobbs, J. A Computational Approach to Discourse Analysis.
(Research Report 76-2). New York: Department of Computer
Science, City College, City University of New York, 1976.
Huggins, A.W.F. Sentence Syntax. In R. Spiro, B. Bruce &
W. Brewer (Eds.), Theoretical Issues in Reading
Comprehension. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, in
press.
Huxley, R. The Development of the Correct Use of Subject
Personal Pronouns in Two Children. In G. Flores d'Arcais &
v. Levelt (Eds.), Advances in Psycholinguistics. The
Netherlands: North-HoTTand-PubTTshing Co., 1970.
Kartunnen, L. What do Referential Indices Refer To? (RAND Report
P-3854). Santa Monica CA: RAND Corporation, 196P.
Kartunnen, L. Pronouns and Variables. In R. Binnick et al.
(Eds.), Papers from the Fifth Regional Meeting of the
Chicago Lin-guistics SocieTy, Chicago, IL, 199. 9
Kartunnen, L. Discourse Referents. In J. McCawley (Ed.) Syntax
and Semantics (Vol. 7). New York: Academic Press, 1976.
Klappholz, A. & Lockman, A. Contextual Reference Resolution.
American Journal of Computational Linguistics, 1975, 4.
Kuno, S. Some Properties of Non-Referential Noun Phrases. In R.
Jakobson and S. Kawamoto (Eds.), Studies in General and
Oriental Linguistics. Tokyo, Japan: TEC Company Ltd., 197•.
Kuno, S. Three Perspectives in the Functional Approach to
Syntax. In Grossman, San & Vance (Eds.), Papers from the
Parasession on Functionalism. Chicago, IL: Chicago
LinguTistics Society, 1975.
- 36 -
Anaphora
Kuno, S. Subject, Theme and the Speaker's Empathy -- A
re-examination of relativization phenomena. In C. Li (Ed.),
Subject and Topic. New York: Academic Press, 1976.
Lakoff, G. Counterparts, or the Problem of Reference in
Transformational Grammar. In Harvard Computation Laboratory
Report NSF-24, 1970, 23-36.
Lakoff, G. & Ross, J.R. A Note on Anaphoric Islands and
Causatives. Linguistic Inquiry, 1972, 3(1), 121-127.
Langacker, R. Pronominalization and the Chain of Command. In
D. Reibel & S. Schane (Eds.), Modern Studies in English.
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1966.
Landsbergen, S.J. Syntax and Formal Semantics of English in
PHLIQAl. Preprints of the International Conference on
Computational Linguistics (COLING-76), 1976, Ottawa, Canada.
Levin, J.A. Proteus: An activation framework for Cognitive
Process Models (Working Paper WP-2). Marina del Ray, CA:
Information Sciences Institute, 1976.
Maratsos, M. The Effects of Stress on the Understanding of
Pronominal Co-reference in English. Journal of
Psycholinguistic Research, 1973, 2(1), 1-?.
Morgan, J. Pragmatics. In R. Spiro, B. Bruce & W. Brewer
(Eds.), Theoretical Issues in Reading Comprehension. New
Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, in press.
Nash-Webber, B.L. A Catalogue of Pronominal Referents.
(Technical Report) Center for The Study of Reading, U. of
Illinois and Bolt Beranek & Newman Inc., forthcoming.
Nash-Webber, B.L. & Reiter, R. Anaphora and Logical Form: On
Formal Meaning Representations for English. (CSR-36) Center
for the Study of Reading, U. of Illinois and Bolt Beranek &
Newman Inc., 1977.
Norman, D.& Rumelhart, D. Explorations in Cognition, San
Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Co., 1975.
Partee, B.H. Opacity, Coreference and Pronouns. In Harman and
D. Davidson (Eds.) Semantics of Natural Language. The
Netherlands: D. Reidel, 1972.
Partee, B.H. Deletion and Variable Binding. In E. Keenan (Ed.)
Formal Semantics of Natural Language. England: Cambridge
University Press, 1975.
Postal, P. On So-called Pronouns' in English. In D. Reibel &
S. Schane (Eds.) Modern Studies In English. New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, 1966.
- 37 -
Anaphora
Reinhart, T. The Syntactic Domain of Anaphora. Unpublished
doctoral dissertation, Department-of Foreign Literatures and
Linguistics, MIT, 1976.
Rieger, C.J. Conceptual Memory. Unpublished doctoral
dissertation, Stanford University, Department of Computer
Science, 1974.
Rosenberg, S. Discourse Structure.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Artificial
1976.
(Working Paper 130).
Intelligence Laboratory,
Ross, J.R. Constraints on Variables in Syntax. Unpublished
doctoral dTssertation, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, 1967.
Ross, J.R. The Superficial Nature of Anaphoric
Linguistic Inquiry, 1971, II(4), 599-600.
Islands,
Rubin, A. The Relation Between Comprehension Processes in Oral
and Written Language. In R. Spiro, B. Bruce & W. Brewer
(Eds.) Theoretical Issues in Reading Comprehension, New
Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, in press.
Sag, I. Deletion and Logical Form.
dissertaTonl, TMIT Department of
Linguistics, 1976.
Unpublished doctoral
Foreign Literatures and
Scha, R. Semantic Types in PHLIQA1. Preprints of the
International Conference on Compuitaonal-- LinguistTcs
(COLING-76) , 1976, Ottawa, Canada.
Wasow, T. Problems with Pronouns in Transformational
Unpublished ms. , Department of Linguistics,
University, 1976.
Wilks, Y. A Preferential, Pattern-seeking Semantics for
Language. Artificial Intelligence, 1975, 6, 53-74.
Grammar.
Stanford
Natural
Winograd, T. Understanding Natural Language. New York: Academic
Press, 1972.
Woods, W.A., Kaplan, R.M. & Nash-Webber, B.L. The Lunar Sciences
Natural Language Information System: Final Report. BBN
Report 2378, Bolt Beranek and Newman Inc., Cambridge, MA,
1972 (NTIS No. N72-23155).
- 38 -
CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF READING
TECHNICAL REPORTS
No. 1: Halff, H. M. Graphical Evaluation of Hierarchical Clustering
Schemes, October 1975.
No. 2: Spiro, R. J. Inferential Reconstruction in Memory for Connected
Discourse, October 1975.
No. 3: Goetz, E. T. Sentences in Lists and in Connected Discourse,
November 1975.
No. 4: Alessi, S. M., Anderson, T. H., £ Biddle, W. B. Hardware and
Software Considerations in Computer Based Course Management,
November 1975.
No. 5: Schallert, D. L. Improving Memory for Prose: The Relationship
Between Depth of Processing and Context, November 1975.
No. 6: Anderson, R. C., Goetz, E. T., Pichert, J. W., & Halff, H. M.
Two Faces of the Conceptual Peg Hypothesis, January 1976.
No. 7: Ortony, A. Names, Decriptionsa,.nd Pragmatics, February 1976.
No. 8: Mason, J. M. Questioning the Notion of Independent Processing
Stages in Reading, February 1976.
No. 9: Siegel, M. A. Teacher Behaviors and Curriculum Packages:
Implications for Research and Teacher Education, April 1976.
No. 10: Anderson, R. C., Pichert, J. W., Goetz, E. T., Schallert, D. L.,
Stevens, K. V., & Trollip, S. R. Instantiation of General
Terms, March 1976.
No. 11: Armbruster, B. B. Learning Principles from Prose: A Cognitive
Approach Based on Schema Theory, July 1976.
No. 3!2.: Anderson, R. C., Reynolds, R. E., Schallert, D. L., & Goetz, E. T.
Frameworks for Comprehending Discourse, July 1976.
No. 13: Rubin, A.D., Bruce, B. C., & Brown, J. S. A Process-oriented
Language for Describing Aspects of Reading Comprehension,
November 1976.
No. 14: Pichert, J. W., & Anderson, R. C. Taking Different Perspectives
on a Story, November 1976.
No. 15: Schwartz, R. M. Strategic Processes in Beginning Reading.
November 1976.
No. 16: Jenkins, J. R., & Pany, D. Curriculum Biases in Reading
Achievement Tests, November 1976.
No. 17: Asher, S. R., Hymel, S., & Wigfield, A. Children's Comprehension
of High- and Low-Interest Material and a Comparison of Two
Cloze Scoring Methods, November 1976.
No. 18: Brown, A. L., Smiley, S. S., Day, J. D., Townsend, M. A. R.,
& Lawton, S. C. Intrusion of a Thematic Idea in Children's
Comprehension and Retention of Stories, December 1976.
No. 19: Kleiman, G. M. The Prelinguistic Cognitive Basis of Children's
Communicative Intentions, February 1977.
No. 20: Kleiman, G. M. The Effect of Previous Context on Reading
Individual Words, February 1977.
No. 21: Kane, J. H., & Anderson, R. C. Depth of Processing and
Interference Effects in the Learning and Remembering of
Sentences, February 1977.
No. 22: Brown, A. L., & Campione, J. C. Memory Strategies in Learning:
Training Children to Study Strategically, March 1977.
No. 23: Smiley, S. S., Oakley, D. D., Worthen, D., Campione, J. C., &
Brown, A. L. Recall of Thematically Relevant Material by
Adolescent Good and Poor Readers as a Function of Written
Versus Oral Presentation, March 1977.
No. 24: Anderson, R. C., Spiro, R. J., & Anderson, M. Schemata as
Scaffolding for the Representation of Information in
Connected Discourse, March 1977.
No. 25: Pany, D., & Jenkins, J. R. Learning Word Meanings: A Comparison
of Instructional Proceduires and Effects on Measures of Reading
Comprehension with Learning Disabled Students, March 1977.
No. 26: Armbruster, B. B., Stevens, R. J., S Rosenshine, B. Analyzing
Content Coverage and Emphasis: A Study of Three Curricula
and Two Tests, March 1977.
No. 27: Ortony, A., Reynolds, R. E., & Arter, J. A. Metaphor: Theoretical
and Empirical Research, March 1977.
No. 28: Ortony, A. Remembering and Understanding Jaberwocky and Small-Talk,
March 1977.
No. 29: Schallert, D. L., Kleiman, G. M., & Rubin, A. D. Analysis of
Differences Between Oral and Written Language, April 1977.
No. 30: Goetz, E. T., & Osborn, J. Procedures for Sampling Texts and Tasks
in Kindergarten through Eighth Grade. April 1977.
No. 31: Nash-Webber, B. Anaphora: A Cross-Disciplinary Survey, April 1977.
No. 32: Adams, M. J., & Collins, A. A Schema-Theoretic View of Reading
Comprehension, April 1977.
No. 33: Huggins, A. W. F. Syntactic Aspects of Reading Comprehension,
April 1977.
No. 34: Bruce, B. C. Plans and Social Action, April 1977.
No. 35: Rubin, A. D. Comprehension Processes in Oral and Written
Language, April 1977.
No. 36: Nash-Webber, B., & Reiter, R. Anaphora and Logical Form: On Formal
Meaning Representations for Natural Language, April 1977.
No. 37: Adams, M. J. Failures to Comprehend: A Question of Balance, April 1977.
No. 38: Woods, W. A. Multiple Theory Formation in High-Level Perception,
April 1977.
No. 39: Nickerson, R. S., & Adams, M. J. Uses of Context in Speech
Understanding and Reading, April 1977.
No. 40: Brown, J. S., , Co.llins- A.. Model-Based 'Versus Tex.teBased Reasoning,
April 1977.
No. 41: Anderson, R. C., o Pichert, J. W. Recall of Previously Unrecallable
Information Following a Shift in Perspective, April 1977.
No. 42: Mason, J., Osborn, J., & Rosenshine, B. A Consideration of Skill
Hierarchy Approaches to the Teaching of Reading, April 1977.
No. 43: Collins, A., Brown, A. L., Morgan, J. L., & Brewer, W. F. The
Analysis of Reading Tasks and Texts, April 1977.
No. 44: McClure, E. Aspects of Code-Switching in the Discourse of Bilingual
Mexican-American Children, April 1977.
No. 45: Schwartz, R. M. Relation of Context Utilization and Orthographic
Automaticity in Word Identification, May 1977.
No. 46: Anderson, R. C., Stevens, K. C., Shifrin, Z., & Osborn, J.
Instantiation of Word Meanings in Children, May 1977.


